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CIA #5495
17 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DIAAP-1C

ATTENTION : [REDACTED]
SUBJECT : Review of [REDACTED] Historical Data Base
REF : DIAAP Letter Serial S-3032, same subject

1. We regret that this office does not have the resources to review definitively the [REDACTED] Historical Data Base as requested in the referenced letter. One comment that we have after a cursory review of the data, however, may be of interest to you.

2. If the data are to be used, among other things, to provide a basis for determining changes in truck traffic levels over time, the number of trucks observed should probably be adjusted by the number of sorties that were flown and the number of roadwatch teams that were used to obtain these observations. As presently constituted, the data consist of gross numbers which fluctuate considerably from month to month, reflecting in part double counting and significant changes in the number of ground and air observers and in the number of days of observation. We believe, therefore, that the data would be more meaningful if they also included information on the number of roadwatch teams that were employed, the number of days of ground observation, and the number of air sorties that were flown during the respective time periods.


[REDACTED]
Chief, Logistics Branch
Office of Economic Research

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Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - IRA
1 - D/I
2 - I/L

OER/I/L [REDACTED] (17 Jul 68)

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13 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Burton R. Brown, USA
Deputy Assistant Director for
Intelligence Production
Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Cooperation with DIA [redacted]
[redacted] Working Group

1. I have received your letter of 11 March requesting that this Agency assign a representative to serve as point of contact with the [redacted] working group.

2. Our point of contact will be [redacted]
of the Office of Economic Research, [redacted]
[redacted]

/s/ R. J. Smith

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence

ODDI [redacted] 18 Mar 68)

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1 - DCI

✓ 1 - OER, CH/st/A

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1 - Exec Chrono

✓ 1 - DD/OER
[redacted]

CONCUR:

15/
GEORGE A. CARVER, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Date

18 MAR 1968

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49 MAR 1968

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14 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference with [] DIA, Regarding
Intelligence Inputs for Evaluation of []

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1. [] briefed members of the SAVA and OER on 12 March regarding the problems associated with the preparation of the historical intelligence base required by MACV and the Seventh Air Force for the evaluation of the Mud River and Truck Driver portions of the [] program.

2. [] indicated that the DCI will receive a letter soon from the Director DIA, requesting OER and SAVA participation in an inter-agency working group, chaired by a representative of DIA. This group will attempt to marshal all intelligence resources in Washington to aid MACV and the Seventh Air Force in their evaluation of the [] program. The working group will consist of representatives of the various components of DIA interested in the program, and representatives of Army, Air Force and Naval intelligence, the Defense Communications Planning Group, OASD/SA, NSA, NIC and CIA. The members of the working group will serve as points of contact within their various components to receive requests for intelligence support for the evaluation of the program. The working group will not be charged with an evaluation of the [] program.

3. The letter to the DCI will also ask the Agency to comment on and evaluate two historical data bases which we will be receiving from DIA this month. One will be on air defense and will include such things as the date of information, weapon types, location, intensity of fire, total hits and total aircraft downed. The second, on vehicular traffic and personnel infiltration will consist of the date of information, low and high estimates of vehicles or personnel within the various segments, high and low estimates of casualties to vehicles and personnel within the various segments, and movements by day and night into and out of the area by source of information.

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4. It is recommended [redacted] be made the OER representative for the proposed working group. We anticipate no difficulties in commenting on the historical data base on truck movements. Other components of the Agency may be better prepared to comment on the air defense and infiltration data bases. The responsibility for evaluating these bases can be postponed until the information arrives and we have a chance to go over it.

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[redacted]
Chief
Indochina Division

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 1 March 1968
TO: DD/OER		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM: Ch/D/I		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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10 JAN 1968

Ch/D/I

DD/OER

25X1 [] Reports

25X1 The attached seems to be the second field report on
25X1 the results of the [] program. I would like
[] to look this over and to be sure
they are getting all of the reports. I also would like to
be informed as to their opinion of the reporting system,
how it affects our operations, and how they propose to
use it. I would also like some action to be taken to be
sure we are cut in with the workings of this evaluation
group. Now that the DIA team must have returned from
Saigon, I think [] should take the
initiative to find out what went on during those meetings.
Perhaps the Colonel could be invited over here to brief us.

25X1 []
25X1 PAUL V. WALSH ✓

Attachment:

Department of Defense
Message No. 77618 re:

25X1 []
Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee w/att.
1 - D/OER w/o att.

1 - DD/OER w/att.

25X1 DD/OER [] (10 Jan 68)

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*See Def Statement
Jan. 1968*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Accordingly, we have developed a new anti-infiltration system,

25X11 to help cope with this problem. This system has three parts. The first subsystem will be a strong-point/obstacle line running in a continuous trace 20 kilometers inland from the sea, about ten miles south of the Ben Hai River. It will consist of four strong points (including Conthien and Goi Linh) and four supporting bases. The strong points will be manned by South Vietnamese troops, about one battalion in each. The supporting bases, with the artillery, will be manned by U.S. Marines. The obstacle system itself will consist of a continuous barrier of concertina barbed wire, mine fields and special sensors employing magnetic, seismic and pressure detection devices. Infrared and radar systems will also be used, as well as the newly developed night vision devices, to aid in the detection of infiltrating personnel.

The second subsystem will consist of two more separate strong points, located on a line running southwest from the inland terminus of the first subsystem, and air-seeded and air-monitored sensor/mine fields. This subsystem, stretching perhaps 20 kilometers west into Laos, will be concentrated on the main trails and will be optimized for the detection of personnel. By and large, the sensors will be air dropped, but in certain areas where we can use ground reconnaissance teams, hand emplaced sensors will also be used.

The third subsystem will run inland from the western end of the second subsystem and will cover the main truck routes in Laos. The sensor fields used in this system will be optimized for the detection of trucks.

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Reaction to infiltration activities detected along the strong-point/obstacle system will be at the discretion of the local commanders, with artillery, air support of air mobile forces being called in as required. Information generated by the two air-emplaced air-monitored systems will be fed into an infiltration surveillance center located in Thailand with reaction being at the discretion of the 7th Air Force Commander.

Operational tests of various elements of the [REDACTED]


25X1

[REDACTED] indicate a tenfold increase in vehicle and personnel detection. If such an increase in detection can be realized across the board, the number of vehicles destroyed or damaged per sortie should be greatly increased and the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam greatly reduced.

The third subsystem, over the truck routes in Laos, is already in place, and first results are quite encouraging. The second subsystem went into operation the beginning of this year, and we do not as yet have sufficient data to judge its performance. The strong-point/obstacle system is well along in construction and should be completed in the Spring.

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Mr. Walsh
File

11 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [] Working Group - 8 November

1. [] PRACTICE NINE, called today as a result of the [] Working Group Meeting attended by [] OER, and myself on 7 November. 25X1

2. Two items of interest to SAVA, OER, and FE were discussed at the 7 November meeting. The first, a historical data base for truck movement through the [] area and the rest of the Panhandle, combined with a method of evaluating future truck movements and kills; the second, an agreed-upon (community-wide) monthly figure for PAVN infiltration through Laos into SVN for the historical data base, and a method to evaluate future personnel interdiction over the Dump Truck trail system. I feel that there are several items that must be resolved between OER and DIA (although, perhaps, I'm premature in my misgivings):

a. Resolving of discrepancies between roadwatch reporting and FAC or aerial observation of particular road segments.

b. Evaluation of truck kills to date.

c. History of truck flow patterns from Mu Gia through the [] area.

d. Future criteria for truck kills after inception of [] [] 25X1

e. Resolving MACV personnel infiltration figures to date.

f. Future criteria and methodology for estimating personnel infiltration.

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3. During the 8 November conversation with [redacted], he agreed that [redacted] would be a valuable permanent member of the [redacted] Working Group. I feel that this is necessary in order to protect our own interests in the area, and also necessary in order to slant the evaluation system so that it agrees with results of the Agency's analysis.

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4. [redacted] also discussed the personnel infiltration evaluation project, feeling that NPIC might be able to provide yeoman service in this field. I replied that it was certainly worth looking at from the P.I. point and that IAS had provided certain studies of this sort in the past, pointing out way-stations and heavily traveled, currently used trails. [redacted] group has been able to perform photo analysis on the Dump Truck area with a view to placing sensors along the trail. Future analysis of the use of trails would entail regular photographic coverage of the Dump Truck area and minute read-out to determine whether trails were falling into disuse, or were being steadily travelled. At the present time I feel that a monthly read-out would be ideal; however, I'm not competent to determine the number of photo interpreters necessary to perform the work, or whether it should be performed by IAS. The DOD priority is, of course, the highest possible for support of the [redacted] program.

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5. I agreed to pull together some of the past reports of trail usage and to discuss the problem with IAS.

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[redacted]
Vietnamese Affairs Staff

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Original - GAC; Interdiction Barrier File

✓ - VAS Chrono

O/DCI/SAVA/JFR:lkp/11Dec67

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